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The relation between work organisation and technological practices in auto industry is 
analysed in this article. The concept  of “technological practice” in this sector is used to 
describe the specific ways of embedding information and communication technology 
applications into the organizational forms and cultural patterns. This concept was developed 
with the Sowing project (TSER, DG XII) and that approach included either the shop floor co-
operation up to the regionally based networks of companies and supporting institutions. The 
authors studied different sectors in the automotive firms of different European countries 
(Germany, Belgium and Portugal): shopfloor and production lines, design and management 
and the local inter-relationships. It was underlined some evidencies of the different alternatives 
in terms of technological practices for the same sector. Much of the litterature try to 
disseminate an idea of a single (and optimum) organisational model for the same type of 
product. And here, even with the same type of technology, and of product (medium-high 
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range), one can find different models, different cultures, different ways of organising the 
industrial structure (firms, regional institutions, R&D centres) in the same sector (auto 
industry). 
Keywords 
Automobile sector; technological practice; Information and Communication Technologies; 
work organisation; industrial structure; production models. 
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This paper refers to the relation between work organisation and technological 
practices in automobile industry. The concept  of “technological practice” in 
this sector is used to describe the specific ways of embedding information and 
communication technology (ICT) applications into the organizational forms and 
cultural patterns. This concept was developed with the Sowing project (TSER 
Programme-Targeted Socio Economical Research, European Commission) that 
analysed the process of such practices held in different intra- and inter-
organizational fields. This research project involved eight European research 
institutes from similar number of countries (WRC of University of Tampere, 
Finland; ITAS-Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Germany; Nexus Europe, Ireland; 
IRES, Italy, Fac. Sciences & Technology of University Nova of Lisbon, 
Portugal; HIVA of Leuven University, Belgium; Institute of Employment 
Studies, United Kingdom, and FORBA, Austria). The aim of the firm survey 
was to focus on the opinions and perceptions of company managers in the eight 
regions. It was decided that the number of observations would be small (100 per 
region) in order to have comprehensive data concerning all the aspects relevant 
in the research. Since the sample was small, it was considered impossible to 
conduct a representative sectorial analysis by limiting the number of industrial 
sectors, as many sectors were heterogeneous. The small numbers of cases in 
each sector do not allow to cover their diversity, so the samples in different 
regions may very well cover companies of a different nature. This happened to 
be the case of the automobile sector. In all cases it was mailed a questionnaire 
and conducted interviews. 
In this article, we will describe the technological practice relying on the 
automobile industry in three of those European countries (Germany, Belgium 
and Portugal). The research focus on the question is how the emerging 
technological practices within companies were influenced by the ICT and how 
these technologies have been supported by the institutions of regional and 
national environments. Methodologically the concept of technological practise 
was divided into three levels: the level of application, the level of organisational 
change and the level of the firm's culture. Thus we could identify different 
concepts of technological practises in different European countries. 
The automobile industry played an important role of the empirical findings in 
different countries. Here we have been analysed the findings from Germany, 
Belgium and Portugal, where the industrial structures are know to be very 
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different. 
The production logic of VCG-Volvo Cars Ghent (Belgium) and AutoEuropa 
(Portugal) still shows some characteristics of Fordism, such as its traditional 
belt-driven assembly line and production jobs co ntaining mainly short-cycle 
tasks. On other hand, the team concept is implemented and supported by 
intensive rotation-schemes. The VW-Volkswagen group factory in Portugal 
revealed an interesting dimension, and that is the specificity of the local network 
of institutions and firms that developed new forms of co-operation with evident 
regional impact. At Daimler Benz (Germany) the analysis was done specifically 
to the service sector, although the changes are of the same type as in the 
automobile division. 
In spite of the expectation of the project, a turning point in the evolution of the 
companies organizational culture can nonetheless be made out. The Daimler-
Benz group had been active on the global level much earlier than the merger 
with Chrysler, but executive functions were – culturally and organizationally – 
still strongly imbedded in regional and national structures. This, however, seems 
to have come to an end with the merger with Chrysler. Information 
technologies, however, can’t be held responsible (in the sense of giving the 
impulse) for these various transformations, but are rather to be seen as 
technologies which support this process, and make it technically feasible. 
So, in this paper, we will be underline some evidencies of the importance and 
different alternatives in terms of technological practices for the same sector. 
Generally the litterature describes the idea of a single and optimized 
organisational model for the same type of product [cf. 2, 12, 16], where 
contingency can be found [9, 10]. But even with the same type of technology, 
one can identify different models, different cultures, different ways of 
organising the industrial structure (firms, regional institutions, R&D centres) in 
the same sector (auto industry). Technological practise cannot be regarded as a 
single pattern, which takes part in the global production process. 
 
Technological practices 
In the Sowing project conclusion, we could find for all the sectors that modern 
ICT are providing options for horizontal co-ordination and communication. And 
it becomes the technological basis for the development of intra- and inter-
organisational network forms. However, were found barriers that hinder the 
diffusion of network structures within and between companies. Not all 
companies studied in the Sowing survey apply modern network technologies, 
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although the case studies in the automobile sector demonstrate the use of those 
technologies. And, some companies didn’t realise the enabling character of 
modern ICT opening up opportunities to designing organisation forms 
according to the network model. 
In this European research project was included quantitative research, with a 
company survey conducted in each country. A questionnaire was designed to be 
administered in the region selected by each project partner. The questionnaire 
addressed the extent and nature of ICT use, aims and barriers related to 
introducing ICTs, companies’ organisational restructuring practices and 
personnel policy as well as managers’ attitudes to modern ICTs. The firm survey 
was conducted at the establishment level.   
Besides the applications of modern ICT, technological practices also include 
organisation forms, companies' strategic goals and specific cultural patterns. As 
the elements of technological practices are closely linked and mutually 
influence each other, we can speak of a process of co-evolution [17]. Also, the 
technological practices can be analysed on different organisational levels. In 
general there exists a variety of technological practices in companies, so one can 
speak of a fractional organisation. Each practice creates a specific potential way 
of use of modern ICTs. The Sowing project research, however, has mainly 
focused on the analysis of technological practices on the organisation level 
The empirical analysis demonstrated that the organisational restructuring seems 
to be a common practice within companies. About 75% of all companies that 
took part in our study have undergone organisational changes during the period 
1994-1999. In more than half of all cases in which restructuring has taken place, 
modern ICTs were seen as playing an important role, either as the driving or 
facilitating factor. Over 80% of the companies in the Stuttgart area, Portugal, 
and the Tampere region (three of the studied regions) had introduced 
organisational changes. In particular, companies in Portugal, and especially 
companies in the Tampere region, had restructured their organisations more 
extensively (idem). 
Data from this Sowing project also mention that companies in the transport and 
finance sectors, in the business services, in light manufacturing and other 
manufacturing are more advanced in introducing organisational changes, 
whereas companies in the sales and hotel sector are less active in this respect. 
Particularly companies in the manufacturing sectors mention modern ICTs 
(EDI, NC machine-tools, robotics, CAD/CAM, CAP) as an important 
stimulating or enabling factor for organisational changes. 
The analysis of this firm survey suggests the distintion between four patterns of 
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techno-organisational systems. 20% of all companies have not taken steps to re-
structure their organisation form and use ICT only as information processing 
tool, if at all. We can characterise these companies as conservative concerning 
their re-structuring strategy. One out of three companies only focuses its 
modernisation strategy on the use of ICT in the modern form as communication 
device (the technically oriented modernisers), while about 20% of all 
companies focus their renewal strategies on organisational re-structuring, hardly 
using ICT in a modern way (the organisationally oriented modernisers). 
About 25% of  all companies seem to orient their restructuring strategies on the 
network organisation, together with the massive introduction of modern ICT. 
Nevertheless, these firms have developed new organisational practices. Here we 
can speak of a high-tech network organisation. Those were most of automobile 
sector cases. But only 10% of all companies have fully applied the network 
model, having vertically and horizontally restructured their organisation model 
together with the establishment of technical connections internally and 
externally. The majority of the companies have only partly introduced the 
network model, they have established technological networks with external 
partners and they have only partly restructured their business processes. 2/3 of 
them have hierarchically de-integrated while the rest has introduces measures to 
functionally integrate production processes. 
The restructuring clusters also revealed significant differences concerning the 
way how modern ICT is used. In this Sowing project survey finding it is clear 
that, with a few exceptions, differences occur between the two Fordist types of 
organisation on the one hand (the one that represents the companies that have 
not taken steps to restructure their organisation form and use ICT only as 
information processing tool – or the low-tech Fordist model, and the other that 
represents the group of companies as technically oriented modernisers – the 
“high-tech Fordism”) and the more flexible network forms on the other. This 
holds true for the two tool functions (time and quality), for the organisation 
function and for the information provider function. Not surprisingly control and 
communication function are also important for the ICT based Fordism, while 
the surveillance function is most important for low-tech Fordist companies. 
 
Volkswagen (AutoEuropa) case – Palmela (Portugal) 
This company was created in 1991 from a joint venture between Ford and 
Volkwagen, and since it started its production (in early 1995) then had a larger 
impact in the productive structure in Portugal, once it incorporates almost 50% 
of national added value. It’s production volume is around 130 thousand 
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vehicles/year, which give an average of 32 vehicles produced per worker.  
The case presented here is the AutoEuropa factory that assembles multi-propose 
vehicles from Ford, VW and Seat (and is expected to start a new one for 
Skoda). Although it was a Ford-VW joint venture, since 1999, VW assumed the 
control all over the company. Its implantation as a greenfield site originated 
substantial changes in the way as firms relate themselves in a network [12], 
although it didn’t produced a modern industrial district. In other words, it didn’t 
create a true manufacturing “system” that stimulated externalities and synergies, 
influencing all the local entrepreneurial fabric [5]. Nevertheless, it was a case 
that assumed its functions on the qualification and training process, articulating 
also with the regional vocational training institutions. At the same time, it was a 
case of significant investment on ICT for a single large factory, specially in the 
field of manufacturing automation and robotics. 
When this is combined with short lead-times and minimum inventories of 
incoming components, it produces a system that is extremely dependent on 
reliability in deliveries, especially in the last stage from the first-tier supplier to 
the point-of-assembly. A high level of importance regarding logistical 
relationships is associated with frequent deliveries and sequential Just-in-Time 
production [11]. 
As several authors mentions, one way to overcome problems with product 
quality or delivery is to organise the supply-linkages in such a way that new 
products and production plans are developed in co-operation. In order to 
benefit, the buyer needs to build a collaborative relationship with the 
subcontractor within a lean production strategy. This includes sharing 
information and integrating the production process so that the new products can 
be put into production without delay. In fact, AutoEuropa developed an 
information system with suppliers that enables this kind of strategy, once can be 
considered as high-tech network organisation, with wide usage of ICT. These 
applications are not only located for administration, process control or 
engineering activities, but are also disseminated at the shopfloor, characterised 
by NC machine-tools, robotic cells, AGV, or automatic wharehouses. This kind 
of flexible manufacturing equipment is connected with quality control systems 
and computer-aided planning that can be used by shopfloor working teams.  
The establishment of strategic alliances is one commonly used form of formal 
inter-firm arrangement around a specific purpose or project [1, 5, 11]. The main 
area for strategic alliances in the automotive industry is in Research & 
Development where costs generally are extremely high and problematic for one 
company to handle. This was one of the reasons for VW and Ford begin their 
co-operation in the new multi-purpose class vehicles. 
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One further method of integration is to establish relationships with suppliers 
with responsibility to develop entire modules. A module-supplier has 
responsibility for product development and co-ordination of the assembly of a 
number of components into a finished product, ready to fit into the car. 
Examples of this are complete seats with the correct colour and clothing; 
painted bumpers complete with spoilers and fog-lights or entire interiors such as 
cockpit-modules. 
The most striking outcome of the new supplier strategies based on modules and 
sequential deliveries was the establishment of a supplier-park in close proximity 
to the assembly plant in Palmela (near Setúbal). On this site the first tier supplier 
units were located. These units are also international joint ventures among 
national second tier suppliers and foreign firms. We could acknowledge clear 
similarities between this type of organisation, and other type, as for example in 
Volvo in Sweden [1]. 
This shift in supplier practices opened up for the large international supplier 
groups to develop links with national industries and establish themselves in the 
supplier-park. The traditional suppliers did not have the capacity to become 
responsible for entire modules, most of  them with technological complexities. 
In this process, the Ford company (that was a member of the AutoEuropa joint 
venture) was responsible for the certification of those supplier units. And this 
certification process was not only agreed with the ISO 9000 principles, but 
included several other items related with work organisation principles. The 
influence in the regional and national industrial fabric related to this project was 
very strong, once new organisational themes were discussed and introduced in 
all those firms. The work group concept was a novelty for most of those firms.  
Furthermore this Ford certification process  (Q-1 and Q101) worked as a 
catalyst for new a supplier hierarchy with a small number of module/system 
integrators at the top (first tier) that can react in 2 hours to the demand, followed 
by many of the traditional suppliers established in national market in the second 
tier (nearby suppliers that respond within 1 day or 1,5 days). The first tier 
represents firms that, for example, assemble the driving clusters, the seating 
groups, or the complete wheel system, and are located very close to the VW 
factory. The second one is more specialized on specific assembled products 
(cabling systems, optics, sensors, driving wheels, transmissions). The third tier 
(external suppliers) are normally the national and regional firms that are 
specialised suppliers of international groups and firms (tyres, glasses, motor 
components, metal moulds for casting, plastic components, suspentions, etc.). 
Most of them are traditional suppliers in the automotive chain, and have more 
than 2 days to react to AutoEuropa demands. 
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The development of local supplying firms can be an indication of the 
increasingly networked organisation where large international suppliers act as 
integrators of resources rather than manufacturers of single products. What we 
should look for is the location and distribution of resources in the network 
belonging to each supplier. In the AutoEuropa case, we can include as 
assembling integrators the Delphi, Continental tires, Visteon, Bosch, Sommer 
Allibert, Vanpro, Gillet, Siemens, among other companies that are developing 
joint-ventures with Portuguese firms. Using this point of departure we can say 
that economies are created for the entire network, thus diminishing the need for 
scale-economies at local plant level. This means that in spite AutoEuropa has 4 
thousand direct workers at Palmela plant, the employment volume of people 
related with this Ford-VW product are around 9 thousand in Portugal. It is rather 
a question of where to locate resources such as manufacturing, development, 
management, sales, procurement and others. 
The work organisation is based on group work concepts were the operators in 
involved in job rotation schemes but not in job enrichement: the workers only 
participate on quality control decisions. They don’t elect the team leaders, don’t 
participate in the decision about division of tasks, or working times. The nature 
of the working teams are inspired on the Toyota model of organisation. 
The emphasis lays on the control issues, where the job autonomy is resticted. 
The selection of members of working groups is done by the  sector responsibles 
(supervisors and superintendents), although workers are encouraged to 
contribute their ideas and suggestions to improve their jobs, following the 
Japanese kaizen principles [3]. These continuous improvement activities are 
task-centred, rather than power centred. That means that are oriented to the 
operational level (task) more then to the decisional level (power).  
The studies done here demonstrated that these kaizen activities represent a form 
of involvement rather than an opportunity for participation, leading to a 
simplification of procedures that can be transformed into norms and regulations. 
It seems that there is no clear shift from the taylorist form of work organisation, 
although it includes steps forward into the process of involvement of workers. 
 
 
Daimler-Chrysler case – Sindelfingen and Stuttgart-Untertürkheim 
(Germany) 
In 1997,  the Daimler-Benz concern gave itself a new organizational structure. 
At the same time, the Mercedes-Benz Corp. was renamed Daimler-Benz Corp. 
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The business segments Passenger Cars, Commercial Vehicles, Aerospace 
(Daimler-Benz Aerospace), Services (debis), as well as directly-led industrial 
holdings were established. Daimler-Benz Aerospace was sub-divided into six 
operating areas (Commercial Aircraft and Helicopters, Military Aircraft, Space 
Flight Infrastructure, Satellites, Defense and Civil Systems, as well as 
Propulsion Systems). The business segment Services, represented by debis, 
comprises the areas Financial Services and Insurance, IT-Services, 
Telecommunications and Media Services, Commerce and Real Estate 
Management. The holdings are railway systems with Adtrans (ABB/Daimler-
Benz Transportation Corp. resp. PLc), the area Diesel Engines (MTU), as well 
as micro-electronics (TEMIC). 
The corporation’s history is characterized by continuous and consistent 
expansion. Every merger resulted in organizational changes within the newly-
refounded company, which can be retraced for only the past decade. This 
history, however, shows in a quite impressive manner that its specific corporate 
logic and corporate culture had been laid down from the very beginnings. By 
means of its technical innovations, the company has, by making use of its 
leader role, first opened and then formed the automotive market, and has been 
able to maintain its market-leader position to the present. The intensive 
scientific development of automotive technology became in this manner the 
motor and basis of its success on the markets. Continuous expansion, influence 
in other branches of the economy, as well as mergers with other business 
enterprises gave impetus for permanent transformation of the entire Daimler-
Chrysler group. 
If one lets the concern’s history pass in review, the changes in the years 1997 to 
1999 appear as a logical continuation of a market strategy which has committed 
itself to growth as well as to market leadership. The concern has developed 
itself steadily from a local to a global economic actor. 
A turning point in the evolution of the company’s organizational culture can 
nonetheless be made out. Daimler-Benz had been active on the global level 
much earlier than the merger with Chrysler, but executive functions were – 
culturally and organizationally – still strogly imbdded in regional and national 
structures. This, however, seems to have come to an end with the merger with 
Chrysler. There are signs for intensive orientation on a US-American model of 
management (gradual cutback in conditions negotiated in collective bargaining, 
reliable committments in favor of the jobs in the Stuttgart area only until the end 
of the year 2000, even more comprehensive rationalization measures in 
planning, etc.). 
This group is active in quite different branches, in which ICT-application has 
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developed into the technical basis for work-processes (manufacturing, services, 
administration and management). The fields of application for ICT have a 
broad, multifunctional nature which in the course of time has decimated jobs in 
the training occupations through rationalization, but has always reformed and 
accelerated work. In retrospect, these changes make judgement of the relation of 
cause and effect by the introduction of ICT quite difficult. In the case of this 
company, one can nonetheless postulate a decision-based transformation which 
– according to the maximization strategy of corporate logic – is constantly on 
the search for means and methods of increasing efficiency, respectively, of 
quality assurance for products on the market. 
In particular, the Daimler-Chrysler group’s role as a global player makes ICT a 
decisive application-oriented instrument which enables the concern to give up 
regional production sites, or to build up new ones. Standardization of the ICT-
system is, further, intended to make it possible to interlace complex work-
processes. These processes can then be accelerated and decentrally organized, 
that is to say, fundamental conditions of time and space for work-processes are 
being radically changed. Which concrete effects this would have on 
occupational profiles and on working conditions can’t yet be foreseen. 
Organizational changes were initiated as a result of the merger with Chrysler. 
This is remarkable, because only a few years earlier, the internal structure had 
already been reorganized into more decentralised forms of organization. In the 
first phase of restructuring, levels of authority had been reduced, individual 
divisions, commercial segments etc. granted more autonomy and empoweered 
to make decisions, among other measures. After the merger in the past year, this 
reform was rescinded in favor of centralized corporate leadership. This means 
that levels of management were established which have assumed the 
responsibility for an area in all concern segments worldwide. In this way, a 
standardization of the styles of management as well as of the objectives takes 
place. The specific, nationally or regionally diverse organizational principles of 
the various segments lose importance in the process. 
Working conditions for the individual employee changed in just the reverse 
direction as described above, i. e., standardized or formal conditions are 
transformed into individualized employment contracts. Time- and decision-
making structures, tasks and goals, are increasingly being agreed upon and laid 
down in an individual labor contract and are evaluated by various methods in 
the course of the work. In this manner, career plans and performance patterns 
develop, which differ from those of the standard negotiated collective 
agreements. The individual employee is put into the position of working to 
one’s own account. Further, good work is rewarded by means of various 
incentives. 
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On the whole, the individual’s decision-making competence has been reduced 
by central management following the merger. By means of individually-
negotiated performance requirements, however, the multipurpose job profile is 
gaining ground. This is brought about by means of various mechanisms: In the 
first place, by periodic evaluation of performance, management tries to employ 
labor as efficiently and as selectively as possible. Second: the prevalence of 
team- and project-work makes abilities such as social competence, foreign 
languages and the like, necessary. And third, due to the general acceleration of 
work-processes, so-called lifelong learning is becoming more and more 
important, and is being rated as a prerequisite for a successful career. The 
individual is – much often than ever – subject to the mechanisms for evaluation 
of his work. According to individual de mands on oneself, or on life, this 
situation can be perceived as positive or negative. 
ICT play a central role in these transformations, although it is not to be assumed 
that they were the cause for these changes. Putting these decision-based reforms 
into practice, however, would be inconceivable without the technical basis ICT 
provide. Especially in consequence of the spatial interlacing of the concern, ICT 
have become indispensable [7]. 
Formerly, working conditions in Germany had been organized according to 
collective bargaining agreements. The employees profited by way of dividend 
payout procedures from the corporation’s material successes, and, as a rule, 
identified themselves strongly with their workplace. The concern’s workers are 
primarily men. Women are employed above all in administration, so that full-
time employment is the normal time-structure (but part-time models can also be 
negotiated). 
Following the merger, a great deal of insecurity arose among the employees, 
because the jobs at the main production site were guaranteed only until the end 
of the year 2000. The future of the business segments in the Stuttgart area is 
uncertain. Because the Daimler-Chrysler group is very strongly oriented on the 
market, or rather, on the profit-margin, there is, on the whole, little confidence 
in the executive floor’s committment to keep the jobs in the region if interesting 
alternative offers are made. This insecurity has already led to conflicts among 
the employees. 
The orientation in the direction of a globally operating concern therefore leads 
to a certain decoupling of the region, especially when corporate objectives are 
formulated elsewhere (USA). The goal worldwide standardization of the 




VCG/Volvo – Ghent (Belgium) 
Belgium is a country of car manufacturers. Every year, more than one million 
cars are constructed here by Ford (33.5%), Opel (31.6%), Volkswagen (19%) 
and Volvo (16%). The Belgians assemble most cars in the world per head of the 
population: in 1998, 105 cars were assembled for every 1 000 inhabitants, 
which is more than the Japanese (87 cars) or the German (61 cars) average. The 
plant studied was established in 1965 as the first Volvo plant outside  Sweden. 
VCG-Volvo Cars Ghent is the largest manufacturing unit of the Volvo Car 
Corporation with 4 thousand direct workers, and mainly produces cars. The 
activities related to sales, purchase, marketing, etc. belong to the responsibility 
of the headquarters in Göteborg. This Ghent plant assembled in 1998 more than 
150 thousand cars. 
Price, productivity and quality have always been important competitivity 
features. More recently, delivery periods have become an important field of 
competition, plus the flexibility to allow for late changes in customer orders. 
Flexibility and innovation also grew in importance in view of increasing 
fluctuations in demand response the ever shortening of product life cycles. 
The creation of a car is the result of three activities: welding, painting and final 
assembly. These are also the three major business units of VCG, belonging to 
the department ‘manufacturing’. The responsibilities of this department are 
much broader than production sensu strictu and in fact, they are still increasing. 
Over the years, almost all activities related to quality control and maintenance 
have been integrated in the manufacturing department, which is also responsible 
for its own logistics and material handling. The underlying reasons for the 
ungoing incorporation of supporting activities in the manufacturing department, 
is achieving a more efficient course of the production process, together with the 
empowerment of the people involved (based on teamwork). 
In general, the amount of supporting (staff) services and indirect employees is 
rather small, given the size of the company. VCG also has very little hierarchy 
for a company of almost 4 000 employees. In fact, there are only 4 layers : 
board of directors, core management, ‘area responsibles’ (e.g., white collar 
employees responsible for first line supervision in a specific area) and 
production teams (blue-collar core workers coached by a team leader, who is 
also a blue collar worker). In the course of past 20 years, the amount of 
hierarchical levels has been reduced drastically, together with the gradual 
development of teamwork and the dismantling of huge supporting departments. 
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The cornerstone of VCG’s organisational logic, as already insinuated a couple 
of times, is its well-elaborated teamwork. VCG really was – and still is - a 
pioneer in the field of teamwork. The company already started working with its 
VEC-teams (VEC stands for Volvo Europe Cars) somewhere in the beginning 
of the 80ies. 
A VEC-team consists of 10 to 15 members and a team leader, co-ordinating the 
internal work organisation of the team. Within the teams, a flexible allocation of 
workers is reached through job rotation. A comparative analysis of all Belgian 
automobile companies showed that job rotation at VCG is most systematic and 
extensive : all production workers are involved in rotation, rotation happens 
over ca. 4 (sometimes up to 10) work places, rotation can happens every 2 
hours, etc. In the other plants, rotation is much more limited and incidental. 
Rotation between work places allows the job content to be enhanced; in other 
words, it results into job enlargement. For employees, it has the advantage of 
giving more variety, thereby reducing the routine & blunt character of the 
machine-paced work. For the organisation, the resulting polyvalence is 
handsome tool for coping with unforeseen absentees or for redistributing 
operations, e.g. after rebalancing of the line [4]. 
However, VCG’s teamwork goes far beyond simple job rotation. More 
important is the gradual and still continuing evolution of incorporating 
additional responsibilities within the production team. The underlying filosophy 
is to make better use of the available capacities, in order to achieve a more 
autonomous and efficient functioning of the team. Over the years, thinks like 
first line maintenance, quality assurance, material supply, etc. have been 
integrated in the VEC-teams, combined with a restructuring of the formal 
organisation in order to achieve closer support from the strongly reduced staff 
departments to the production teams. Usually, additional responsibilities for 
teams are assigned to a specific function within the team or to the teamleader, 
while the job content of the other members remains unaltered. At VCG, 
however, additional responsibilities for the team must be interpreted as allocated 
to all team members, since everybody rotates over a number of indirect jobs 
within the team. Rotation means more than just ‘doing more of the same’ or 
simply job enlargement. Involvement in off-line activities supporting the team 
functioning also implies a true job enrichment. 
In line with this, VCG recently started another phase in the evolution towards 
semi-autonomous teans, i.e. the phase of self-management. In this phase, each 
of the team members have been given the ownership of a specialised theme or 
topic, in correspondence with his own field of interest, capacities and 
competencies. The themes can vary according to specific team needs, but good 
examples are prevention of damages, safety and environment, follow-up of 
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product quality, prevention of breakdowns and short stops, etc. Every team has 
been given 2u a day to engage in these so-called VEC-activities. Also here, a 
rotation scheme is applied. Every day, someone else gets the opportunity to be 
releaved from the conveyor belt and to do some work on the topic he’s chosen 
for. This allows to make better use of the available human capital, by simple 
addressing and stirring up sometimes hidden qualifications. In general, the self-
management programme should increase the self-supporting character of the 
team as well as the general quality level of the team and organisation tout court. 
Every two weeks, the conveyor belt is shut down for a VEC-team meeting of 
about 30 minutes (during the working hours). The purpose of the meeting is 
discussing about problems, exchanging information, etc. Since the latest phase 
of teamwork, the ‘theme-owners’ also use the meeting to inform the others 
about activities and plans concerning their specific theme. Sometimes, cross-
team meetings are organised between the owners of simular themes. Obviously, 
the team-meetings cost the company a whole lot of money, but VCG is 
convinced they pays off! 
In general, teamwork was characterised by its gradual and stepwise 
implementation. Evolving from very narrow Tayloristic jobs to richer jobs, 
characterised by self-management in semi-autonomous teams, implies a long 
learning process that cannot be pushed top-down. Team members have to 
receive off-the-job training to enable them to jump to a subsequent stage and 
take on additional responsibilities. However, the time provided to reach a next 
step is only loosely defined, allowing for differences between teams. In fact, the 
team evaluates each step on a weekly basis. When a team feels confident in 
mastering more additional responsibilities, a screening committee is invited to 
repeat the evaluation. If approved, the team is awarded a green circle on its 
VEC team board, and may move on to a subsequent step. 
In general, it’s rather difficult to categorize the organisational logic of VCG or 
to put the plant in a pre-defined cell. In fact, complete studies and articles have 
been devoted to this single topic and, in fact, this argumentation is largely based 
on a study published by Gerpisa [8]. On the one hand, the production logic of 
VCG still shows some characteristics of Fordism, such as its traditional belt-
driven assembly line and production jobs containing mainly short-cycle tasks. 
One the other hand, one has to bear in mind the very well implemented team 
concept supported by intensive rotation-schemes. This rotation includes an 
unsually broad range of heterogeneous, also off-line, jobs. This integration of 
different jobs within production functions was made possible through an 
impressive shift from staff departments towards lower levels of the production 
hierarchy. Finally, the team’s ability to determine the speed of their own 
trajectory must be stressed. 
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All these characteristics of the VEC team model cannot be labelled as Fordist or 
machine bureaucratic at all. Support and preparation on the one hand and 
execution on the other hand, are brought closely together. By reducing this kind 
of division of labour, supporting tasks can be performed in the immediate 
proximity of the line. The elimination of barriers between departments as well 
as between production workers in order to allow a flexible allocation of the 
workforce are features of a lean production approach. The attempt by VCG to 
mobilise all production workers in off-line activities supporting the general 
functioning and autonomy of the team, even goes beyond the lean production 
practices. At the same time, is still far away from the innovations breaking 
completely with the assembly line and choosing for teams assembling complete 
cars rather then small parts of it (cf. experiments of Volvo-Udevalla or Saab-
Kalmar). Because VCG is going further then the (Japanese) lean production 
processes, but not so far as the (Swedish) experiments characterised by long 
work cycles, Huys and Van Hootegem [8] talk about ‘a third way’. 
We can say VCG combines some features typical for mass production in a 
machine bureaucratic environment (e.g. conveyor belt with machine-paced, 
short-cyclical work) with modern organisation and management principles, 
more fitting the J-model or, to a lesser extend, even the operational adhocracy 
(e.g. job enrichment in autonomous teams, self-management). Putting VCG in 
one of these cells would be a static solution denying the dynamics of reality. In 
fact, VCG is already working for ca. 20 years on reducing vertical integration 
(bringing execution and decision-making closer together) and increasing 
horizontal integration (by means of semi-autonomous teams). In general, we 
could say VCG is ‘under way’, trying to move away from the traditional 
Tayloristic approach towards more progressive and human solutions. In some 
fields, more progress is made then in others, and the different parts of the 
organisation can be in different stages of development. 
 
Three cases under three models? 
All the cases mentioned here can be included in some of the most advanced 
models of the organisation of automobile industry in Europe. All of them are 
developing intra- and inter-organisational network forms. But they are reflecting 
also the differencies that are more and more evident in the automobile industry 
in Europe. 
As Boyer and Freyssenet mentioned, two new industrial models were 
simultaneously being developed in the Japanese automobile industry: the 
Toyotan model privileging “permanent reduction of costs at constant volume”, 
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and the Hondian model implementing a totally different profit strategy of 
“innovation and flexibility” [2]. These two models were erroneously placed 
under the same heading of lean production despite the fact that they differ 
significantly on essential points.  
The remarkable performances of the firms which embodied these models 
(Toyotan and Hondian) did not chase however the Sloanian model away, 
Volkswagen adopted it as of 1974, and was able to exploit it profitably in the 
context of a renewed market. These three firms Toyota, Honda, and Volswagen 
were in fact the only ones to have a “break-even point” that was constantly and 
significantly above their value added, whereas all other carmakers had 
experienced periods of non-profitability. 
For these mentioned authors, Volkswagen followed a profit strategy based on 
volume and diversity thanks to internationalization, the buying out of other 
carmakers and the commonalization of car models platforms (the case of 
AutoEuropa is very clear on this issue). The modularisation strategy is not yet 
implemented in all types of products, and can be an evidence when the 
platforms are identical. 
In fact, some authors, as Michel Freyssenet recently mentioned [6] saw the “new 
productive model” as nothing more than a variant of the old Fordist model. But, 
for others they considered that there had always been a plurality of models, and 
even others contested the very idea that there is such a thing as a model. Finally, 
we can find those who agreed with the idea of “lean production”, but who felt 
that its variants were based on specific national environments.  
The success or failure of firms' internationalisation drives, continues Freyssenet, 
depends on the compatibility between their model and the market and labour 
conditions in the various spaces they were moving into. It seems to be the case of 
these firms in Germany, Belgium and Portugal. 
All of the cases mentioned in this article are located in different national contexts, 
but all of them are using intensivelly ICT from the shopfloor level to the design 
areas, and all of them are specialised in medium-high range car models, with 
increased technological practices based on quality control, intensive flows of 
information and communication, and leading networks of suppliers. 
So, for the German case of Daimler-Benz we can conclude that it inscribes in 
the new “sloanian farmework”. This model (named after Alfred Sloan, under 
whose presidency this model was theorized and constructed at General Motors) 
is the model that implemented the "volume and diversity" strategy. It relies on 
an "enterprise government compromise" essentially established between 
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managers and one or several powerful and professionalized unions. It thus takes 
on the form of a social compromise wherein accepting work organization and 
promoting social peace is compensated by programmed growth in worker's 
buying power, promotions in the workplace, and the expansion of both social 
protection and union rights.  
The Sloanian product policy is multi-brand, offering parallel ranges whose 
models of same market segment share the same platform while offering a 
number of versions and options. Productive organization is characterized by the 
centralization of strategic choices and the decentralization of their 
implementation within divisions; relying on subsidiaries or sub-contractors for 
numerous components so as to displace a part of diversity to them and to 
benefit lower prices due to their economies of scale obtained thanks the orders 
from other clients; machine polyvalence (multi-specialized) and mechanical 
assembly lines with buffers to saturate the production tool despite vehicle 
variety. The employment relationships under this technological practice model 
consist of applying the "enterprise government compromise" under the union's 
control, and in the name of polyvalent workers paid in function of job 
evaluation of work stations they successively have. 
Since the 1960s, no firm having adopted the "quality" strategy in Europe (as, for 
example, BMW, Mercedes, Saab or Volvo) experienced a break-even point 
constantly above added value. Though their profit strategy was pertinent, their 
"enterprise government compromise" was not sufficiently robust. Although it 
was a socially favorable environment, these firms could control the supplier 
costs. They attempted to apply "socio-technical" approach to the labour crisis. 
One of the most well-knowned case, was the Volvo, specially in Sweden. 
These experiences considerably enlarged the cycle times, introducing modular 
work, and systematically improved the work station ergonomics and the 
working conditions. In addition, the image of quality could be reinforced by 
publicity concerning new production methods. The y were presented more 
dignified than the “mass production” methods for the demanding customer who 
wanted a car to become the object of special attention. Volvo went the furthest 
along the path of "work reform" by radically splitting from the assembly line, 
replacing it with assembling in fixed parallel stations, notably in its new 
Uddevalla plant. But both at Volvo and other firms, employment relationships 
and product policy were not coherently conceived of in relation to the new 
productive organization so as to generate as much benefit as possible in terms of 
personalization of response to demand (be it in the realm of delays, costs, 
product improvement and adaptation, and service). 
The Daimler-Chrysler merger, increasingly seen as the former acquiring the 
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latter, and its relation with Mitsubishi compromised the productive structure to 
become a worldwide firm to be present within all segments of the automobile 
market: top-of-the-line in each segment, the first market (mass oriented and 
hierarchized), the second market (innovative varied and variable models). The 
objective was to respond to all kinds of demands, also explains the succesive 
takeovers of Jaguar, Aston Martin and Volvo by Ford, and its propo sal to 
purchase Land Rover. Volkswagen itself implemented a strict "volume and 
diversity" strategy which commonalized the platforms of its four brands of 
classic sedans, and now want to make them all: MPV of VW, Ford and SEAT, 
luxurious cars with Bentley, Lamborghini and Bugatti, recreational vehicles, 
heavy trucks with Scania. 
If the coexistence of two markets should persist, differentiating themselves 
according to the world's regions or even by country, it is possible that certain 
firms will attempt and succeed in rendering volume, diversity, innovation, and 
flexibility compatible. One can acknowledge other experiences, as General 
Motors rendered volume and diversity compatible in the 1920s and 1930s.  
To achieve this aim, General Motors was required to invent a new automobile 
architecture, with commonalized platforms and car models differing on the 
“surface”, and the construction of new socio-productive principles: polyvalency 
and supplying. This means a completely new technological practice, that we 
could characterise as organisationally oriented moderniser, where ICT are not 
determinant for their change. 
So if modular vehicles are more than just a way of outsourcing a maximum 
quantity of work, this means that a new network organisation can take place 
more intensivelly in this automobile sector. The possibility to be able to design 
innovative models thanks to different combinations of shared elements, is a 
completely different issue. As we can see from these cases, only the Daimler-
Chrysler can perform this activity, once, neither AutoEuropa, nor VCG, a re 
firms with decision on the design of new models. They depend, about that, on 
the owners (VW and Volvo) located elsewhere.  
The reflexive production, with appropriate employment relationships, is a 
characteristic of the “high-tech network organisations” that developed new 
forms of work organisation together with networking relations with their 
suppliers, using intensivelly ICT. But this technological practice can be found in 
all the three case, although we can find them very different. When one is 
presented as a multidimensional group that influenced the re-structuring 
strategy, with a new worldwide focus (Daimler-Chrysler), others depend on 
their mother-firms. And these, one follows the organisational advantages of the 
Swedish socio-technical approach to re-structuring, assuming most of the lean 
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production processes, and the other, dependent from the VW global strategy, is 
implementing the Japanese strategies of organisational change, to develop an 
increased workers involvement in the control process. But these firms has few 
autonomy, although the central offices of Mercedes are located in Stuttgard, but 
management objectives are designed in United States. 
So, in fact, the technological practice cannot be understood as a single pattern, 
even when we can find strong similarities, achieved from the same sector, and 
with the same kind of product. On the contrary, there are strong differencies 
based on the local ways of organising the industrial structure, that are developed 





The research focus of the Sowing project was on the analysis on how the 
emerging technological practices within companies were influenced by the ICT 
and how these technologies have been supported by the institutions of regional 
and national environments. In this article we tryed to underline evidencies of the 
importance and different alternatives in terms of technological practices for the 
automobile sector. And we could find that even with the same type of 
technology, one can identify different models, different cultures, different ways 
of organising the industrial structure (firms, regional institutions, R&D centres) 
in the same industry. Technological practise cannot be regarded as a single 
pattern, which takes part in the global production process. The cases of 
Daimler-Chrysler in Germany, Volvo in Belgium and VW in Portuga l 
demonstrates it. 
These companies seemed to orient their restructuring strategies on the network 
organisation, together with the massive introduction of modern ICT. They have 
fully applied the network model, having vertically and horizontally restructured 
their organisation model together with the establishment of technical 
connections internally and externally. 
 
In fact, all the cases mentioned here can be included in some of the most 
advanced models of the organisation of automobile industry in Europe. But they 
are reflecting also the differencies that are more and more evident in the 
automobile industry in Europe. Volkswagen followed a profit strategy based on 
volume and diversity thanks to internationalization, and the commonalization of 
car models platforms (AutoEuropa as an example). The German case of 
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Daimler-Benz inscribes in the new “sloanian farmework” that implemented the 
"volume and diversity" strategy. It is a strategy for an "enterprise government 
compromise" that takes on the form of a social compromise wherein accepting 
work organization and promoting social peace is compensated by programmed 
growth of social structure in a globalised framework. Volvo went the furthest 
along the path of "work reform". But both at Volvo and other firms, 
employment relationships and product policy were not coherently conceived of 
in relation to the new productive organization. The example of factories outside 
Sweden can be an example of it. 
 
So, the structure of division of labour in each of the studied firms remains the 
most important indicator to acknowledge the possibilities for participation of 
workers and design of workplaces. And the empirical results seems to show 
these limits for participation that are performed by the different technological 
practices based on different cultures, different ways of organising the industrial 




[1]  ALVSTAM, C.-G. & LARSSON, A. (2000) Subcontractors, Supplier Parks and the 
Supply-Chain Management: The Case of Volvo Arendal Supplier-Park, Göteborg. 
Sweden in M. Taylor and E. Vatne, (eds.). The Networked Firm in a Global World. 
London: Ashgate.  
[2]  BOYER, R. & FREYSSENET, M. (2000)  The World that Changed the Machine: 
Synthesis of GERPISA Research Programs, 1993-1999, GERPISA report. 
[3]  CASACA, Sara F. (1998)  O envolvimento dos trabalhadores no melhoramento contínuo 
(kaizen), Organizações e Trabalho, 20, Lisbon. 
[4]  DEJONCKHEERE, J. & VAN HOOTEGEM, G. (2000)  Interim report: Regional Case 
Study Report Flanders (Belgium), Leuven, HIVA. 
[5]  FERRÃO, J. & VALE, M. (1994) “People carriers, a new opportunity for the European 
periphery? Lessons from the Ford/VW project (Portugal)” in HUDSON, R.; SCHAMP. E. 
(eds.): Towards a New Map of Automobile Manufacturing in Europe? New Production 
Concepts and Regional Restructuring, Springer Verlag. 
[6]  FREYSSENET, Michel (2001) Histoires paralèlles: IMVP et le GERPISA. Réflexions sur 
les formes de coopération en sciences sociales (2 ème partie, les années 90), La Lettre du 
Gerpisa, Paris, 151. 
[7]  FREDERICHS, G., KRINGS, B.-J. & KUSCHE, I. (2000)  SOWING Case Study Report, 
Karlsruhe, ITAS. 
[8]  HUYS, R.& VAN HOOTEGEM, G. (1999) Volvo-Ghent: a third way? in Durand, J., 
Stewart, P. & Castillo J. eds.  Teamwork in the automobile industry: radical change or 
passing fashion ?, Gerpisa, MacMillan Business, pp. 308-324. 
[9]  KAST, F.; ROSENZWEIG, J. (1985) Organizations & management. A systems and 
contingency approach, McGraw-Hill Co. 
[10]  KERN, H.; SCHUMANN, M. (1984) Das Ende der Arbeitsteilung? Rationalisierung in 
der industriellen Produktion, München. 
[11]  LARSSON, A. (2000) The Effects of Globalisation and Modularisation: The changing 
geographical structure of the domestic supplier-system of Volvo Automotive in Sweden, 
in GERPISA: 8th International Colloquium Proceedings, Paris,. 
[12]  MONIZ, António B. (1993) Estratégias de empresas trans-nacionais (TNE) em 
economias periféricas: O sector automóvel e o projecto da VW/Ford em Portugal, 
 23 
relatório FAST/FINE, Anex 3, Brussels-Gelsenkirchen, IAT. 
[13]  MONIZ, António B. (1998) Novos modelos de produção na indústria automóvel? Análise 
de uma fábrica de motores, in APSIOT: Formação, Trabalho e Tecnologia, Para uma 
nova cultura organizacional, Oeiras, Celta Ed.. 
[14]  MONIZ, A.B. & KOVÁCS, I. (2000) Conditions of Inter-firm Co-operation in a Virtual 
Enterprise Concept:  The Case of Automotive Sector in Portugal, in GERPISA: 8th 
International Colloquium Proceedings, Paris. 
[15]  PARCEY, A. (1983): The Culture of Technology, Oxford/New York. 
[16]  SCHIENSTOCK, Gerd et.al. (1999) Information Society, Work and the Generation of 
New Forms of Social Exclusion (SOWING). Technical Systems, Organisation Forms 
and Social Implications. Second Interim Report, Tampere, WRC-UT. 
[17]  SCHIENSTOCK, Gerd et al (2001) Information Society, Employment and New Forms of 
Social Exclusion, Final report, TSER, Brussels. 
[18]  STOLEROFF, A. & CASACA, S.F. (1998) Intensidade de Trabalho e Satisfação na 
Produção Magra. Resultados de um inquérito aos trabalhadores da AutoEuropa, in 
APSIOT: Formação, Trabalho e Tecnologia, Para uma nova cultura organizacional, 
Oeiras, Celta Ed. 
 
View publication stats
